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This paper investigates the rationale behind interlirm tender offers by examining the returns 
realized by the stockholders of lirms that were the targets of unsuccessful tender offers and lirms 
that have made unsuccessful offers. Our results suggest that the permanent positive revaluation 
of the unsuccessful target shares [documented by Dodd and Ruback (1977) and Bradley (1980)] 
is due primarily to the emergence of and/or the anticipation of another bid that would 
ultimately result in the transfer of control of the target resources. We also find that the rejection 
of a tender offer has differential effects on the share prices of the unsuccessful bidding firms 
depending upon whether the tender offer process results in a change in the control of target 
resources. On the basis of these results we conclude that acquisitions via tender offers are 
attempts by bidding firms to exploit potential synergies, not simply superior information 
regarding the ‘true’ value of the target resources. 
1. Introduction and summary 
There is empirical evidence that corporate acquisitions by tender offers 
provide significant and positive abnormal returns to the stockholders of both 
the target and the acquiring firms [Dodd and Ruback (1977), Bradley (1980), 
and Bradley, Desai and Kim (1982)]. This finding is consistent with the 
hypothesis that tender offers are an attempt by the bidding firm to exploit 
some specialized resource by gaining control of the target and implementing 
a higher-valued operating strategy. The revised operating strategy may 
*We have received helpful comments from Carol Eger, Gregg Jarrell, Michael Jensen, Stanley 
Kon, Richard Leftwich (the referee), Myron Scholes, the participants of the Joint Berkeley- 
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involve more efficient management, economies of scale, improved production 
techniques, the combination of complementary resources, increased market 
power, the redeployment of assets to more profitable uses, or any number of 
value-creating mechanisms that fall under the general rubric of corporate 
synergy. The specific nature of the reallocation of the target resources is not 
important to this ‘synergy’ theory of tender offers. Rather, the critical aspect 
of the hypothesis is that the increase in the value of the target shares derives 
from the transfer of control of the target resources and their reallocation 
subsequent to the acquisition. 
An alternative hypothesis, which is also consistent with the existing 
empirical evidence, posits that the revaluation of the target shares is due to 
new information that is generated during the tender offer process. There are 
two forms of this ‘information’ hypothesis. The first argues that the 
dissemination of the new information prompts the market to revalue 
previously ‘undervalued’ target shares. We might refer to this variant as the 
‘sitting on a gold mine’ hypothesis. The second argues that the new 
information induces (allows) the current target management to implement a 
higher-valued operating strategy on its own. We might call this the ‘kick in 
the pants’ variant. In either event, the information hypothesis posits that the 
revaluation of the target shares is generated by actions of the market or the 
target managers in response to new information. That is, the positive 
revaluation does not require a successful acquisition of the target resources. 
Note that the information hypothesis requires that certain capital market 
agents (i.e., the managers of bidding firms) possess (the ability to produce) 
superior information regarding the true (potential) value of the target firm. In 
contrast, the synergy hypothesis does not require such an assumption. 
Unanticipated changes in the product or factor markets (e.g., changes in 
technology or the political climate) may give rise to previously unavailable 
synergies. The synergy hypothesis is consistent with the notion that tender 
offers simply represent reactions by bidding firms to unanticipated changes in 
the product and factor markets. 
There is empirical evidence that is consistent with the information 
hypothesis of tender offers. Dodd and Ruback (1977) and Bradley (1980) find 
that firms that are the targets of unsuccessful tender offers experience 
significant and permanent increases in their share prices. Furthermore, 
Bradley (1980) finds that in unsuccessful tender offers, this permanent 
revaluation of the target shares exceeds the per share premium of the rejected 
bid. In other words, after the announcement of a to-be-rejected offer, the 
market price of the target shares on average is greater than the amount 
target stockholders would have received had they tendered their shares.’ 
‘There is also empirical evidence that the stockholders of targets of unsuccessful merger 
proposals experience a permanent increase in wealth. Dodd (1980) reports that in a sample of 26 
merger proposals cancelled by target managers, target stockholders realized a significant 
‘permanent revaluation’ of their shares by an average of 11%. 
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The apparently permanent revaluation of the shares of targets of 
unsuccessful tender offers seems to contradict the synergy theory of tender 
offers, The results suggest that it is the announcement of a tender offer per se 
(or, more precisely, the information contained therein) that precipitates the 
revaluation of the target shares, not the transfer of control of the target 
resources that accompanies the execution of a successful offer. That is, the 
mere announcement of a tender offer, whether successful or not, appears to 
release positive information regarding the value of the target shares. 
While the revaluation of the shares of targets of unsuccessful tender offers 
is consistent with the information hypothesis, it is not sufficient evidence to 
reject the synergy hypothesis. The positive returns to unsuccessful targets 
may be due to the anticipation of a future, higher-valued bid. Specifically, 
one can hypothesize that prior to the expiration of a tender offer, the target 
stockholders (or, more generally, market participants) form an unbiased 
expectation that a subsequent, higher-valued bid will be forthcoming. If the 
present value of this anticipated future bid exceeds the value of the 
outstanding offer, then target stockholders rationally will let the outstanding 
offer expire.2 In those instances where the target stockholders turn out to be 
correct and a subsequent, higher-valued, successful offer does materialize, 
they will experience an additional increase in wealth. In those instances 
where the target stockholders turn out to be incorrect and a subsequent 
successful bid fails to materialize, the price of the target shares will gradually 
fall back to the pre-offer level, as the uncertainty about the subsequent bid is 
resolved over time. 
In contrast, the information hypothesis states that it is the information 
contained in the tender offer that generates the positive revaluation of the 
target shares. Since there is no reason to expect that the positive information 
will vanish simply because there is no subsequent bid, the information 
hypothesis does not predict that the shares of targets that receive no 
subsequent bid will fall back to their pre-offer level. 
In section 2 we test the competing implications of the synergy and 
information hypotheses by examining the returns realized by the 
stockholders of firms that are the targets of unsuccessful tender offers. The 
unsuccessful targets are separated into two groups: those that became the 
targets of a subsequent successful bid and those that did not. Consistent with 
previous research, we find that target stockholders realize a significant 
positive return on the announcement of a tender offer and the return is not 
dissipated subsequent to the rejection of the offer by the target shareholders. 
However, closer examination reveals that this revaluation is due primarily to 
‘Dodd and Ruback (1979, p. 370), in interpreting the positive returns to unsuccessful targets 
as evidence consistent with their ‘internal efficiency’ hypothesis (our information hypothesis) and 
.inconsistent with the synergy hypothesis, qualify their conclusion by raising the possibility that 
the positive market reaction of ‘unsuccessful targets could be attributed to the expectations of 
future monopoly or synergistic gains from mergers’. 
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the emergence of and/or the anticipation of another acquisition bid. The 
share prices of the target firms that are not targets of subsequent, successful 
acquisition attempts within five years of an unsuccessful offer fall back to 
their pre-offer level. The share prices of those targets that receive a successful 
subsequent bid experience an additional significant positive revaluation. 
The evidence suggests that a permanent revaluation of the target shares 
requires that the target resources be combined with those of an acquiring 
firm. That is, the gains to the stockholders of unsuccessful targets stem from 
the anticipation of a future successful acquisition and not simply from the 
revelation of new information regarding the ‘true’ value of the target 
resources. On the basis of these findings we conclude that the synergy 
hypothesis is more consistent with the evidence than the information 
hypothesis. 
To buttress our test of the competing implications of the synergy and 
information hypotheses, we also examine the returns to the shares of firms 
that have made unsuccessful tender offers. The unsuccessful bidding firms in 
our sample lost bids either to the current target management or to a rival 
bidding firm. Obviously, in the former case there is no transfer of control of 
the target resources, while in the latter case the control of the target 
resources is transferred to a rival bidding firm. According to the synergy 
hypothesis, it is the transfer of control of the target resources (and their 
reallocation subsequent to the acquisition) that is responsible for the positive 
revaluation of the target shares. Consequently, it is possible that unsuccessful 
bidding firms will be affected differently depending upon whether or not the 
tender offer process results in a change in control of the target resources. For 
example, losing the bid for control of a valuable resource, i.e., the target firm, 
to a competitor may have a negative impact on the value of the shares of the 
unsuccessful bidding firm. In contrast, if it is the information contained in the 
tender offer - not the transfer of control - that motivates the tender offer, 
then the returns to the shares of an unsuccessful bidding firm should not be 
affected by whether or not there is a change in control of the target 
resources, 
Our empirical results indicate that, on average, the stockholders of 
unsuccessful bidding firms suffer a significant wealth loss in the wake of an 
unsuccessful offer. Further examination reveals that this wealth loss is due 
solely to the negative returns realized by firms which lose bids for their 
targets to rival bidding firms. That is, if a firm makes an unsuccessful offer 
and the target is not acquired by another bidding firm, then there is no effect 
on the wealth of the stockholders of the unsuccessful bidding firm. However, 
if the offer fails because another firm successfully acquires the target, then the 
stockholders of the unsuccessful bidding firm suffer a significant wealth loss. 
We interpret these results as evidence that successful acquiring firms possess 
specialized resources that allow for a profitable acquisition and that these 
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resources are eventually used to put the unsuccessful bidding firm at a 
competitive disadvantage in the marketplace. This is consistent with the 
implications of the synergy theory of tender offers. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section we 
describe our sample of unsuccessful tender offers. Our results for unsuccessful 
target firms are presented in section 3 and those for unsuccessful bidding 
firms are presented in section 4. In section 5 we summarize our results and 
draw some implications. 
2. Sample characteristics 
The empirical tests of this paper are based on the returns realized by the 
stockholders of firms that either received or made an unsuccessful, control- 
oriented tender offer during the period 1963-1980. We define a control- 
oriented tender offer as one in which the bidding firm holds less than 70% of 
the target shares outstanding and is attempting to increase its holdings by at 
least 15 percentage points.3 We classify a tender offer as being successful if 
the bidding firm increases its holding of the target shares by 15 percentage 
points or more. 
The primary data base of this study consists of 697 intertirm tender offers 
that were made during the period October 1958 to December 1980 where 
either the target or bidding firm was listed on either the NYSE or AMEX at 
the time of the offer. Tender offers through 1977 were identified with the help 
of the data bases compiled by Bradley (1980) and Dodd and Ruback (1977). 
Relevant information for all offers was obtained and/or verified with the use 
of the Wall Street Journal (index and newspaper), Standard and Poors Guide 
to Common Stocks, and the data bases provided by CRSP (Centre for 
Research in Security Prices of the University of Chicago). 
The primary data base contains 371 unique target firms that received one 
or more control-oriented offers. Of these 371 target firms, the initial offers 
received by 241 were successful and the rest (130) were unsuccessful. The 
mean percentages of target shares held, sought and purchased by the bidding 
firms in the sample of successful targets are reported in the first column of 
table 1. Of the remaining 130 target firms that received an unsuccessful, tirst- 
time control-oriented offer, CRSP data are available for only 112.4 The mean 
percentages of target shares held, sought and purchased by the bidding firms 
of these 112 first-time unsuccessful offers are reported in the third column of 
table 1. 
3The 70% criterion is chosen because some corporate charters require a two-thirds or higher 
majority to effect a formal combination of the two firms. The choice of 15% as the cut-off point 
is somewhat arbitrary; however, we feel that the acquisition of at least 15% represents a 
significant transfer of control of the target resources. 
‘Subsequent empirical tests are based on CRSP Daily Return File. Use of this data base 
precludes targets that were not listed on either NYSE or AMEX and offers made before January 
1963. 
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Table 1 
Mean percentage of shares held, sought and purchased by outcome and by target and bidder 
firm samples in the period 1963-1980 (standard deviations in parentheses). 
Unsuccessful 
Successful N = 241 
Mean Median 
Target N = 112 
Mean Median 
Bidder N = 94 
Mean Median 
% of target 
held by bidder 
‘A of target 
sought by bidder 
% of target 
purchased by bidder 
12.81 0.0 3.62 0.0 4.21 0.0 
(20.39) (9.95) (11.73) 
65.29 60.72 61.87 60.02 71.40 89.08 
(30.33) (31.67) (31.64) 
58.80 53.91 0.78 0.0 0.63 0.0 
(28.58) (2.70) (2.47) 
The data reported in table 1 show no significant difference in the 
percentage of target shares sought by the bidder between the successful and 
the unsuccessful target samples: 65.28% and 67.87x, respectively. However, 
the data show a marked difference in the percentage of target shares 
purchased by the bidders in these two samples: 58.8% for the successful 
targets and 0.78% for the unsuccessful targets. These data suggest that our 
outcome criterion is appropriate. The mean percentage of target shares held 
and sought for all of the subsamples in table 1 are also well within our 
definition of control-oriented tender offers. 
The sample of bidding firms used in this study consists of all the firms in 
the primary data base that made one or more unsuccessful attempts to secure 
control of a target firm via an intertirm tender offer. If a bidding firm initially 
fails but subsequently succeeds to gain control of the target, we classify the 
process as a successful acquisition and exclude the bidding firm from the 
sample. Our total sample of unsuccessful bidders consists of 91 unique firms 
that made a total of 94 unsuccessful attempts to acquire a target lirm.5 The 
last column of table 1 reports the mean percentage of target shares held, 
sought and purchased for this sample of unsuccessful bidding firms.‘j 
Table 2 presents a time profile of the unsuccessful targets and bidders. The 
target sample is divided into two subsamples: those firms that were 
ultimately acquired and those that were not. We arbitrarily choose a live- 
year horizon to distinguish between the two subsamples. Thus, of the 112 
target firms receiving an initial, unsuccessful, control-oriented offer, 86 were 
acquired within five years and the remaining 26 were not. 
Qne bidding firm tried unsuccessfully to acquire three different targets and another bidder 
was unsuccessful at acquiring two. The offers made by each bidder were all at least three years 
apart. 
6For bidding firms that made more than one unsuccessful offer for a given target, the data in 
table 1 refer to the parameters and outcome of the initial, unsuccessful (control-oriented) offer. 
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Table 2 
Number of unsuccessful tender offers for both target and bidding firm samples in the 
period 1963-1980. 
Year 
Target firms Bidding firms 
Acquired Not acquired 
within within Change No change 
Total 5 years 5 years Total in control in control 
1963 0 0 
1964 2 2 
1965 1 1 
1966 6 3 
1967 8 6 
1968 9 7 
1969 4 2 
1970 2 2 
1971 0 0 
1972 3 2 
1973 12 8 
1974 10 10 
1975 9 9 
1976 8 5 
1977 7 7 
1978 17 12 
1979 11 I 
1980 3 3 



















































The sample of bidding firms reported in table 2 is also divided into two 
subsamples. The ‘change in control’ subsample consists of those bidding firms 
that lost their bids for their respective targets to a rival bidding firm within 
the tender offer period. The tender offer period extends from the day of the 
announcement of the initial offer to three weeks after the expiration of the 
final offer. (Several of these bidding firms made more than one unsuccessful 
offer.) The mean number of trading days between the announcement of the 
initial unsuccessful offer and the announcement of the subsequent successful 
offer is 60 with a standard deviation of 90. The second subsample consists of 
those bidders who, in a sense, lost their bids to the target managers. In other 
words, the targets of the offers of the bidders in the ‘no change in control’ 
subsample were not taken over by any other firm within the tender offer 
period. 
3. The returns to the shares of targets of unsuccessful tender offers 
In this section we test the implications of the synergy and the information 
hypotheses by examining the returns to the stockholders of firms that were 
J.F E.-- G 
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the targets of unsuccessful initial tender offers. All of the firms in this sample 
were the targets of control-oriented offers. 
To examine the impact of an unsuccessful offer on the wealth of the target 
stockholders, we perform a Cumulative Abnormal Return (CAR) analysis on 
the shares of the firms in the sample. For each firm in the sample, we 
calculate monthly cum-dividend stock returns for 72 months prior to the 
announcement of the initial offer through 60 months thereafter. These 
monthly returns are computed by compounding daily cum-dividend returns. 
This allows us to include firms that are listed on the AMEX in the sample. 
The CAR analyses are based on a monthly time-frame because we are 
interested in the long-term effects of an unsuccessful tender offer, i.e., the 
post-offer price behavior of the target shares over the next five years. 
In event time, month 0 is the announcement month. Thus, event time runs 
from -72 to +60. Data from the event months -72 to - 13 are used to 
estimate the parameters of the market model 
Ri, = Cli + PiRmit + &it, t=-72,..., -13, 
where 
Ri, =cum-dividend monthly stock return for firm i in month t, 
Rmit =return on the equally weighted market portfolio in month t relative to 
the announcement of offer i, 
Cli, fli = regression parameters, and 
&it =stochastic error term, assumed to be i.i.d. normal with mean zero and 
constant variance 0:. 
The abnormal return to firm i in month t is defined as 
ARi, = Ri - 8, - BiRmif, 
where ii, pi are the estimates 
Return (CAR) to the portfolio 
t=-12,..., +60, (2) 
of cli, pi in eq. (l), The Cumulative Abnormal 
of unsuccessful target firms is given by 
CAR= c L 1 ARi,, 
t=t,Nf i=l 
where 
t, =first event month in the CAR calculation, 
T =event month through which the CAR is calculated, and 
N,=number of firms in the portfolio in month t. 
The standard error of the CAR statistics is given by 
(3) 
a(CAR) = a(AR,)& (4) 
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is the abnormal return to the portfolio in month t, a(AR,) is the standard 
error of the monthly abnormal return to the portfolio over the estimation 
period (from months -72 to - 13) and K is the number of months in the 
CAR statistic. 
Table 3 
Percentage abnormal returns (AR) and cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) to unsuccessful 
target firms - total sample and ‘subsequently taken over’ and ‘not taken over’ subsamples in 
the period 1963- 1980. 
Total sample 
Event 
month N AR 
Subsequently taken over Not taken over 



















- 0.95 -0.95 
-0.13 - 1.41 86 
-0.32 - 1.74 86 
3.56 1.83 86 
35.55 37.38 86 
1.09 38.47 85 
-0.80 37.66 82 
-0.73 36.93 70 
0.784 35.84 
1.84 40.42 
- 1.38 39.15 











- 0.92 -0.92 26 - 1.05 
-0.41 -0.76 26 0.80 
- 0.43 -1.19 26 0.03 
2.99 1.80 26 5.46 
39.06 40.86 26 23.94 
4.25 45.10 26 -9.24 
0.02 45.13 26 -3.41 
-0.66 44.47 26 -0.93 
0.61 44.74 25 1.10 
4.86 55.73 23 - 1.71 
0.45 58.99 23 -2.41 
- 1.59 61.38 19 - 1.53 
- 0.03 81.69 14 1.08 
















Table 3 reports the Abnormal Returns (AR) and the Cumulative Abnormal 
Returns (CAR) starting in month -6 for the three different portfolios of 
unsuccessful target firms: the entire sample of unsuccessful targets (columns 3 
and 4); the subsample of firms that are subsequently taken over within five 
years following the end of an unsuccessful tender offer (columns 6 and 7); 
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Fig. 1. Cumulative abnormal returns to unsuccessful target firms - total sample, and 
‘subsequently taken over’ and ‘not taken over’ subsamples in the period 1963-1980. 
and the subsample of firms that are not taken over within the same live-year 
period. The CAR’s in table 3 are plotted in fig. 1 and are summarized for 
various holding periods in table 4. 
Consistent with the findings of Dodd-Ruback and Bradley, the data show 
that target shareholders, on average, realize significant positive abnormal 
returns surrounding the month of the announcement of a tender offer. The 
AR and CAR for the total sample of unsuccessful targets (columns 3 and 4 in 
table 3 and the dotted line in fig. 1) show a positive revaluation of the target 
shares which does not dissipate subsequent to the rejection of the offer by 
the target shareholders. As reported in table 4, the percentage CAR statistic 
from one month before the announcement of the offer through six months 
thereafter (- 1 to + 6) is 37.57 with a t-statistic of 13.69; the fourteen-month 
CAR starting in month - 1 is 42.15 with a t-statistic of 11.61. These results 
for the total sample suggest that it is the announcement of a tender offer per 
se (or, more precisely, the information contained therein) that precipitates the 
revaluation of the target shares, not necessarily the transfer of control of the 
target resources that accompanies the execution of a successful offer. In other 
words, while the acquisition of a target by a bidding firm may be sufficient to 
effect a revaluation of the target resources, it does not appear to be a 
necessary condition. 
As discussed earlier, however, in an informationally efficient capital 
market, the post-expiration price of unsuccessful target shares will reflect an 
unbiased estimate of the probability that the firm will receive a subsequent 
higher-valued acquisition bid. We test this hypothesis by dividing the sample 
of unsuccessful offers into two groups. The first group consists of those firms 
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Percentage cumulative abnormal returns for unsuccessful targets - total sample and 
‘subsequently taken over’ and ‘not taken over’ subsamples in the period 1963-1980 (t-statistics in 
parentheses).” 
Event time period Total sample 
(in months) (N=112) 
Subsequently taken over 
(N = 86) 




-1 to +6 
-1 to +12 
-1 to f24 
-1 to +48 
+1 to +12 
+l to +24 























































“The t-statistics in this table are based on the assumption of serially uncorrelated standard 
errors of the monthly abnormal returns to the indicated portfolio. 
that received a subsequent successful acquisition bid within five years 
following the end of an unsuccessful tender offer. The second group consists 
of those firms that received no subsequent successful acquisition bid either 
within the same five-year period or before December 1981 (the end of the 
CRSP data base). The Abnormal Returns (AR) and the Cumulative 
Abnormal Returns (CAR) to these two subsamples are also reported in tables 
3 and 4 and fig. 1. Nine firms in our ‘subsequently taken over’ sample are 
still listed five years after the initial offer was rejected because of partial 
acquisitions or offers made but not executed before the end of the CRSP 
data base. The fall in the number of firms in our ‘not taken over’ sample is 
due to the twelve firms whose initial event is within five years of the end of 
the CRSP file. These firms are the twelve firms in the fourth column of table 
2 with event dates in or after 1976. 
The abnormal returns to the 86 firms in the ‘subsequently taken over’ 
subsample show a further positive revaluation over the one-year period 
following the announcement of an unsuccessful offer. The CAR from + 1 to 
+ 12 is 15.63% with a t-statistic of 4.10; and the two year CAR from + 1 to 
+24 is 17.35% with a t-statistic of 3.22. 
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In contrast, the CAR to the 26 firms in the ‘not taken over’ sample is 
negative over the one-year period following the announcement of an 
unsuccessful offer. The one-year CAR from + 1 to + 12 is -22.44% with a t- 
statistic of - 3.32; and the two-year CAR from + 1 to +24 is -27.47% with 
a t-statistic of -2.87. Furthermore, the CAR from - 1 to +48 is - 1.07% 
with a t-statistic of -0.08. This shows that whatever abnormal gains the 
target shareholders realized with the announcement of the offer are 
completely wiped out over the ensuing two-year period.’ 
The striking contrast between the returns to the shares of targets that are 
subsequently taken over and those that are not suggests an obvious 
interpretation of unsuccessful tender offer events. The announcement of a 
tender offer causes an immediate increase in the value of the target shares. If 
the target stockholders believe that the present value of an expected future 
acquisition bid is greater than the value of the current bid, they will reject 
the offer. If a subsequent bid does materialize, they realize a greater positive 
abnormal return. If, however, another bid does not materialize, the entire 
positive abnormal returns earned from the announcement of the initial offer 
are dissipated over the following two years. 
These results are consistent with the hypothesis that a successful 
acquisition (change in the control) of the target resources is required in order 
to effect a permanent positive revaluation of the target shares. That is, the 
revaluation requires some specialized resource that is not possessed by the 
target firm. Since according to the information hypothesis the revaluation 
does not require a successful acquisition, the synergy hypothesis appears to 
be more consistent with the evidence than the information hypothesis. 
It should be noted that there is an important distinction among the firms 
in our sample that received an initial, unsuccessful offer and then received a 
subsequent, successful acquisition bid. Prior to the expiration of these initial 
offers, the market may have varying expectations about the probability that 
these firms would receive a subsequent bid. At one extreme, the target 
shareholders may have a higher-valued offer in hand before the initial offer 
expires, i.e., the probability of receiving a subsequent bid is equal to one. In 
less extreme cases, there may just be an unsubstantiated rumor that a higher- 
valued offer is pending or a general feeling among investors that the initial 
bidder will eventually improve the terms of his offer. In these cases, the 
probability of receiving a subsequent bid is less than one. 
To proxy for the variation in the market’s assessment of the probability 
that a higher-valued bid is forthcoming, we separate the sample of 
‘subsequently taken over’ targets into two subsamples; those targets that 
‘These results are consistent with the findings of Asquith (1983) that the announcement of an 
unsuccessful merger bid generates an immediate increase in the value of target shares but the 
entire gain disappears within a year after the termination of the bid. In contrast to Dodd (1980) 
(see footnote 1) Asquith’s sample excludes all merger bids that are followed by a subsequent bid 
within a year after the termination of the initial bid. 
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Table 5 
Statistics on the distribution of the number of trading days between the 
announcement of the initial unsuccessful and subsequent successful offers. 
Subsequent bid 
within 60 trading days 
Subsequent bid 
within 5 years 
but after 60 trading days 
N 65 21 
Mean 17.51 211.43 
Std. deviation 14.71 250.97 
were acquired within three months and those targets that were acquired 
within five years but after three months of the announcement of the initial, 
unsuccessful offer. Table 5 reports the means and standard deviations of the 
number of trading days between the initial, unsuccessful offer and the 
subsequent, successful offer for the two subsamples. The mean ‘gap’ for the 
‘within three months’ subsample is a little over three weeks whereas the 
mean ‘gap’ for the ‘within five years’ subsample is over one calendar year. 
This large difference in the mean ‘gap’ should provide an adequate proxy for 
the market’s subjective probability at the time of the expiration of the initial 
offers that the target will receive a subsequent bid. Presumably, at the time of 
the rejection of the initial offer, the probability of receiving a subsequent bid 
was significantly greater for the firms in the ‘within three months’ sample 
than in the ‘within five years’ sample.8 
Table 6 reports the CAR’s for various holding periods for the ‘within three 
months’ and ‘within five years’ subsamples. The CAR series starting in month 
-6 are plotted in fig. 2. The three-month CAR from month - 1 to + 1 for 
the ‘within three month’ subsample (54.08% with a t-statistic of 26.92) is 
almost twice as large as that of the ‘within five year’ subsample (22.28% with 
a t-statistic of 9.95). However, this difference diminishes over time and 
completely disappears within two years. The twenty-six-month CAR from 
- 1 to +24 is almost indistinguishable between the two subsamples; the 
CAR is 47.69% (t= 8.06) for the ‘within three months’ sample and 54.76% 
(t=4.79) for the ‘within five years’ subsample. Presumably, for the firms in the 
‘within three month’ sample there is little uncertainty regarding the potential 
of a subsequent, successful offer at the time of the rejection of the initial offer. 
Consequently, the entire revaluation of these target shares occurs within one 
month of the announcement of the initial, unsuccessful offer, and there is no 
subsequent revaluation. 
“It is interesting to note that the target firm is about equally likely to be taken over by 
another bidding firm as by the bidding firm that made the initial, unsuccessful offer. For the 
‘within three month’ sample, 60% of the ‘subsequently taken over’ targets were taken over by a 
firm other than the initial (rejected) bidder. The corresponding percentage for the ‘within five 
years’ sample is 48%. 
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Table 6 
Percentage cumulative abnormal returns to targets receiving an 
initial unsuccessful and a subsequent successful tender offer in the 
period 1963-1980 (t-statistics in parentheses).a 
Event time period 
(in months) 
Subsequent bid 
within 3 months 
(N = 65) 
Subsequent bid 
within 5 years 
but after 3 months 
(N=21) 
-1to 0 
-1 to +1 
lto +6 
-1 to +12 
-1 to +24 
-1 to +36 
-1 to +48 
-1 to +60 





































“The t-statistics in this table are based on the assumption of 
serially uncorrelated standard errors of the monthly abnormal 
returns to the indicated portfolio. 
For the firms in the ‘within five years’ subsample, the probability that they 
will eventually receive a subsequent bid must have been far less than one at 
the time of the expiration of the initial offer. This accounts for the fact that 
the three-month CAR (from - 1 to + 1) for the ‘within five years’ subsample 
is significantly less than the CAR for the ‘within three months’ subsample. 
However, as the subsequent bids for firms in the ‘within five years’ subsample 
materialize, the CAR of this portfolio rises. The continuous upward 
revaluation of the shares of the firms in the ‘within five years’ subsample 
reflects the market’s revision of the probability of a subsequent bid from 
something less than one to that of one. 
The stockholders of target firms that received an initial, unsuccessful offer 
but were not subsequently taken over are also likely to be subjected to a 
great deal of uncertainty regarding a future bid at the time of the rejection of 
the initial bid. For this reason, the time series of the CAR to this portfolio is 
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Fig. 2. Cumulative abnormal returns to unsuccessful target firms - ‘subsequently taken over 
within 60 days’, ‘subsequently taken over within 5 years’, and ‘not taken over’ subsamples in the 
period 1963-1980. 
also plotted in fig. 2. The purpose is to contrast the market’s resolution of 
uncertainty concerning a future bid for the firms in this sample with the 
resolution of uncertainty concerning future bids for firms in the ‘taken over 
within live years but after three months’ subsample. 
The difference in the CAR series between the ‘not taken over’ sample and 
‘subsequently taken over within five years’ sample is striking. On the 
announcement of the initial, unsuccessful offer, the target firms in both 
samples experience an approximately equal positive revaluation; the three- 
month CAR from month - 1 to + 1 is 20.16% (t= 5.97) for the ‘not taken 
over’ sample and 22.28% (t=9.95) for the ‘subsequently taken over within 
live years but after three months’ sample. This indicates that at the time of 
the rejection of the initial bid, there is no noticeable difference in the 
uncertainty regarding a future acquisition bid between the two samples of 
firms. However, as the market’s uncertainty regarding the future bid is 
resolved over time, the stockholders of firms in the ‘not taken over’ sample 
lose the entire abnormal returns from the initial bid over the next two years; 
in contrast, those in the ‘subsequently taken over within live years’ sample 
experience a further increase in wealth. The data indicate that most of the 
uncertainty about a future bid is resolved within two years of the 
announcement of the initial unsuccessful offer. 
In sum, the data presented in this section are consistent with the synergy 
hypothesis. The apparently permanent positive revaluation of the shares of 
targets of unsuccessful tender offers (documented by previous authors) can be 
thought of as an evidence that the capital market forms an unbiased 
expectation of future successful acquisition bids. A closer examination of 
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returns to the shareholders of firms that have received unsuccessful tender 
offers reveals that the market’s uncertainty regarding the future bid is 
resolved in a manner that one can expect from an informationally efficient 
capital market. 
4. The returns to firms making unsuccessful tender offers 
In this section we provide further evidence that distinguishes between the 
synergy and information hypotheses by examining the returns to firms that 
have made unsuccessful tender offers. The methodology is identical to the 
CAR analysis described in the previous section except here we use a daily 
instead of a monthly time-frame. We use a daily time-frame because we are 
concerned with the relatively short-run implications of a ,tirm making an 
unsuccessful tender offer. Event day 0 is the announcement day of the first 
bid made by the unsuccessful bidding firm.g 
Table 7 presents the AR and the CAR (starting on day -20) to the shares 
of the 94 firms in the sample that made unsuccessful tender offers over the 
period 1963-1980. These data are reported in the third and fourth columns 
of the table. (Ignore for the moment columns five through ten.) The CAR’s to 
the shares of unsuccessful bidding firms are summarized in table 8 for 
various holding periods. Fig. 3 plots the CAR starting on day -20 for the 
entire sample of 94 firms along with those of two other samples, which will 
be discussed later. Tables 1 and 2 in section 2 contain further descriptive 
data concerning this sample of unsuccessful bidding firms. 
The summary statistics in table 8 reveal a positive revaluation of the 
shares of unsuccessful bidding firms on the announcement of the bid; the 
twenty-two event-day CAR from day -20 to day + 1 is +2.32x (t= 1.98). 
This positive revaluation, however, quickly disappears as it becomes apparent 
that the bid will fail; the nineteen-day CAR from day +2 to day +20 is 
-2.96% (t=2.72), and the two-month CAR from day -20 to day +20 is 
-0.64% (t = -0.40). Thus, twenty days after the announcement, the net 
effect of making an unsuccessful tender offer is zero. However, note that 
the CAR continues to drift downward thereafter. In fact, the eight-month 
‘Because of the change from a monthly to a daily time-frame, the market model parameters 
are estimated on daily basis using sample returns from event day -300 to -61 (or the 
minimum of 60 days for the bids announced during the period of January 1, 1963, through 
October 1, 1963). 
Switching from a monthly to a daily time-frame gives rise to a missing data problem. If 
missing data are encountered in the estimation period, the first valid return after the missing 
returns stream is excluded from the regression since this is a multiple-day return on the CRSP 
files. When missing returns data are encountered in the CAR calculation, the AR is calculated 
using a multiple-day expected return and a multiple-day realized return. The former is obtained 
by compounding the one-day expected return (ai,+biR,J over the period of missing data. The 
latter is given by the next valid return on the CRSP daily return file. When the actual return on 
the day of announcement is missing, this multiple-day AR is attributed to the day of 
announcement. 
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Table 7 
Percentage abnormal returns (AR) and cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) to unsuccessful 
bidding firms - total sample and ‘no change in control’ and ‘change in control’ subsamples in 
the period 1963-1980. 
Event 
Total sample No change in control Change in control 






























94 -0.05 - 0.05 27 0.60 0.60 67 -0.31 -0.31 
94 0.02 0.13 27 -0.14 0.46 67 0.09 0.00 
94 0.17 0.98 27 0.29 3.97 61 0.13 - 0.23 
94 0.16 1.26 27 0.32 3.24 67 0.10 0.47 
94 0.41 1.67 27 0.19 3.43 67 0.50 0.97 
94 0.50 2.18 27 -0.44 2.99 67 0.88 1.85 
94 0.08 2.26 27 -0.31 3.30 67 0.00 1.85 
94 0.31 2.57 27 0.09 3.39 67 0.40 2.24 
94 -0.21 2.36 27 -0.12 3.27 67 -0.24 2.00 
94 -0.05 2.32 26 0.14 3.41 67 -0.12 1.88 
94 -0.38 1.94 26 0.16 3.57 67 -0.58 1.30 
94 0.33 2.27 27 - 0.44 3.12 67 0.64 1.94 
94 -0.19 2.09 27 0.41 3.53 67 -0.42 1.52 
94 -0.60 1.49 27 - 1.10 2.43 67 -0.40 1.12 
94 - 0.07 0.54 27 0.08 1.78 67 -0.12 0.00 
94 -0.49 0.15 27 - 1.29 0.74 67 -0.17 0.10 
93 0.00 - 0.64 26 -0.10 0.43 67 -0.03 -1.05 
94 0.14 - 1.50 27 1.01 0.79 67 0.21 -2.39 
94 -0.12 - 2.29 27 -0.85 0.27 67 0.17 -3.29 
94 0.14 -3.23 27 -0.04 - 1.03 67 0.22 -4.08 
93 0.02 -3.63 27 -0.02 2.29 66 0.04 - 6.00 
93 0.21 -3.31 27 0.17 1.23 66 -0.23 -5.12 
92 -0.37 - 5.87 27 0.02 -0.73 65 -0.53 - 7.92 
90 0.38 - 5.66 26 0.80 1.23 64 0.20 - 8.43 
90 0.23 - 5.49 26 0.38 1.20 64 0.17 -8.18 
0.25 0.47 0.28 
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Table 8 
Percentage cumulative abnormal returns for unsuccessful bidding firms - total 
sample, ‘no change in control’ and ‘change in control’ subsamples in the period 1963- 
1980 (t-statistics in parentheses).” 
Event time period Total sample No change in control Change in control 
(in days) (N = 94) (N=27) (N=67) 
-20 to +1 
+2 to +20 
-20 to +20 
-20 to +140 
-20 to +160 
-20 to +180 




2.32 3.41 1.88 
(1.98) (1.55) (1.43) 
- 2.96 - 2.98 - 2.93 
(2.72) (1.45) (2.40) 
-0.64 -0.10 - 1.05 
(0.40) (0.03) (0.59) 
-5.87 0.73 - 7.92 
(1.85) (0.23) (2.23) 
- 5.66 1.23 - 8.43 
(1.68) (0.19) (2.23) 
- 5.49 1.20 -8.18 
(1.55) (0.18) (2.06) 
0.25 0.47 0.28 
“The r-statistics in this table are based on the assumption of serially uncorrelated 
standard errors of the daily abnormal returns to the indicated portfolio. 
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Fig. 3. Cumulative abnormal returns to unsuccessful bidding firms - total sample, and ‘no 
change in control’ and ‘change in control’ subsamples in the period 1963-1980. 
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CAR calculated over event days -20 to + 140 is - 5.80/:, with a t-statistic of 
- 1.85. To gain insights into this negative market reaction, we divide the 
sample of firms into two subsamples according to the disposition of the 
target shares. 
In 67 of the 94 unsuccessful acquisition attempts in our sample, a rival 
bidding firm successfully acquired the target firm. In other words all of the 
unsuccessful bidding firms in this ‘change in control’ subsample lost their bid 
for the target to another firm. In the remaining 27 unsuccessful acquisition 
attempts, no other firm acquired the target. Thus, in effect, the firms in this 
‘no change in control’ subsample lost their bids to the managers of the target 
firms. 
The AR and CAR to the 27 bidding firms in the ‘no change in control’ 
subsample are presented in the sixth and seventh columns of table 7 and are 
summarized in table 8. Fig. 3 also shows the CAR starting on day -20 for 
this sample. The nine-month CAR statistic from day -20 through day + 160 
is + 1.230/, with a r-statistic of 0.19. This statistic indicates that there is no 
significant change in the wealth of stockholders of firms that make 
unsuccessful tender offers when there is no change in control of the target. 
Therefore, the negative returns to the entire sample of unsuccessful bidding 
firms must be due to the returns to the firms in the subsample in which there 
is a change in control of the target. 
The AR and CAR to the 67 bidding firms in the ‘change in control’ 
subsample are presented in the ninth and tenth columns of table 7 and are 
also summarized in table 8. Fig. 3 shows the CAR for this sample. The nine- 
month CAR statistic from day -20 through day + 160 is -8.43% with a 
t-statistic of -2.23. These results indicate that the negative returns realized by 
unsuccessful bidding firms are due solely to the firms in the ‘change in 
control’ subsample. 
The difference between the CAR statistics for the unsuccessful bidding 
firms in the ‘no change in control’ and the ‘change in control’ subsamples 
suggests the following interpretation. If an unsuccessful offer is the only offer 
the target receives, then there is no effect on the wealth of the stockholders of 
the unsuccessful bidding firm. Apparently, the market does not penalize firms 
for making an unsuccessful tender offer when the target managers retain 
control of the firm. However, if the offer is unsuccessful because another firm 
makes a higher, successful bid, then the value of the unsuccessful bidder falls 
significantly. lo 
The continuous downward drift in the CAR to the firms in the ‘change in 
control’ sample may be explained by the cross-sectional variation in the 
length of the time between the announcement of the initial bid and the time 
‘OAll of the successful bids in this sample were effected at a market premium greater than that 
reflected by the rejected offer. This is consistent with our earlier interpretation of why the target 
shareholders might reject an initial tender offer. 
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Fig. 4. Cumulative abnormal returns to unsuccessful bidding firms in the ‘change in control 
subsample, realigned on the day of announcement of the successful bid in the period 1963-1980. 
Table 9 
Percentage cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) to the 67 
unsuccessful bidding firms in the ‘change in control 
subsample realigned on the day of the announcement of the 
successful bid made by a rival bidding firm in the period 
Event time period 
(in days) CAR t-statistic 
- 10 to + 10 -2.84 -2.38 
+11 to +40 0.81 0.68 
+41 to +80 -0.21 0.13 
+81 to +120 - 1.27 -0.77 
“Standard error to the percentage daily abnormal return is 
0.26. 
bThe t-statistics in this table are based on the assumption 
of serially uncorrelated standard errors of the daily abnormal 
returns to the indicated portfolio. 
the market realizes that a rival bidding firm will successfully acquire control 
of the target resources. The average ‘gap’ between the announcement of the 
initial, unsuccessful bid and the announcement of the bid by the successful 
rival bidder is 60.6 days with standard deviation of 89.7 days. 
To isolate more precisely the effect of losing control of the target resources 
to a rival bidding firm, we re-define event day 0 as the day of the 
announcement of the bid by the successful bidder. If our conjecture is correct 
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in that the change in control of the target resources is responsible for the 
negative drift in the CAR, then realigning the CARS on the day of the 
announcement of the ultimately successful bid should generate a series that 
drops precipitously around event day zero. To the extent that there is 
uncertainty as to which firm will win the bid at the time of the 
announcement by the rival bidding firm, the drop will take the form of a 
downward drift. However, in contrast to the long, continuous downward 
drift over seven months for the ‘non-aligned’ CAR in fig. 3, the downward 
drift of the realigned CAR should be brief and then the series should turn 
into white noise. 
Fig. 4 plots the realigned CAR to the 67 firms in the ‘change in control’ 
subsample with event day 0 as the announcement of the successful rival 
bidder. Since the mean ‘gap’ between the announcement of the initial 
unsuccessful offer and the ultimately successful offer is 60 days we plot the 
realigned CAR from event day -20 through event day + 120. Thus, in some 
average sense, day 120 in fig. 4 corresponds to day 180 in fig. 2. The CARS 
for the realigned sample are summarized in table 9 for various holding 
periods. 
The data in table 9 substantiate the impression given by the plot in fig. 4. 
In the 21-day period (day - 10 to day + 10) surrounding the announcement 
of a successful bid made by a rival bidding firm, the CAR for the portfolio of 
unsuccessful bidders falls a significant 2.84% (t= -2.38). Thereafter, changes 
in the CAR are not significantly different from zero. These results support 
our earlier contention that the continuous downward drift in the CAR of fig. 
3 reflects the arrival of successful offers by rival bidding firms on different 
event days. 
The results in this section suggest that when a firm loses the competition 
for a target firm to a rival bidding firm, the market perceives it to have lost 
an opportunity to acquire a valuable resource. Perhaps the transfer of 
control of the target resources to another firm places the firm at a 
competitive disadvantage vis-a-vis the successful bidding firm. In other 
words, the revelation that a rival bidding firm has sufficient specialized 
resources to effect a successful tender offer may have a value-decreasing effect 
on the shares of an unsuccessful bidding firm. For example, an increase in 
efliciency achieved by the combination may lead to a lower product price 
and thereby reduce the quasi-rents to the unsuccessful bidding firm. Such a 
disadvantage would manifest itself in a decrease in the share price of the 
unsuccessful bidding firm. 
In contrast to the synergy hypothesis, the information hypothesis makes 
no prediction concerning the relation between the share-price behavior of 
unsuccessful bidding firms and the ultimate disposition of control of the 
target resources. It is possible that the costs borne by a bidding firm in 
producing information regarding the ‘true’ value of a prospective target are 
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economically significant. As it becomes apparent that the offer will fail, the 
market value of the bidding firm will fall, reflecting the loss in expected 
benefits from the acquisition. However, there is no reason to believe that 
these information-production costs are in any way related to whether or not 
the target is acquired by a rival bidding firm. Thus, the information 
hypothesis predicts no difference in the returns to the stockholders of the 
unsuccessful bidding firms in the two subsamples.” Unlike the information 
hypothesis, the synergy hypothesis provides at least a plausible explanation 
for the relation between the returns to unsuccessful bidding firms and the 
ultimate disposition of control of the target resources. The data are 
consistent with the joint hypothesis that the ultimately successful bidding 
firm possesses a specialized resource that allows for a higher-valued offer and 
that the synergy created by combining with the target places the unsuccessful 
bidding firm at a competitive disadvantage in the marketplace.” 
5. Summary and conclusions 
In this paper we attempt to provide evidence that discriminates between 
the information and synergy hypotheses of tender offers. Both hypotheses 
predict that a successful tender offer will have a positive impact on the 
wealth of the target firm’s stockholders. Thus, both are consistent with the 
empirical evidence documented in the literature on the returns to the 
stockholders of targets of successful offers. However, the two hypotheses have 
contradictory predictions concerning the returns to the stockholders of 
unsuccessful tender offers. 
The information hypothesis assumes that the rationale behind interfirm 
tender offers is the bidding firm’s discovery of undervalued or underutilized 
assets owned by the target firm. Moreover, the hypothesis assumes that this 
new information becomes a public good subsequent to the announcement of 
the offer and, thus, exploiting the information does not require a specialized 
resource. Therefore, the hypothesis predicts that the target stockholders will 
realize a significant positive abnormal return with the announcement of a 
tender offer and that the return will not dissipate even if the offer is rejected 
by the target shareholders. In contrast, the synergy hypothesis predicts that 
target stockholders will experience an increase in wealth only if control of 
their firm is transferred to another firm. Thus, the hypothesis predicts that 
“While it is possible that the (transactions) costs incurred by bidding firms are substantially 
greater in contested as opposed to uncontested tender offers, the difference in costs cannot 
explain the 10% difference in nine-month CARS to the ‘change in control’ and ‘no change in 
control’ subsamples. 
‘*In a companion paper [Bradley, Desai and Kim (1982)], we document that unlike the 
unsuccessful bidding firms in the ‘change in control’ sample, the stockholders of the 
corresponding successful rival bidding firms do not suffer a wealth loss. The shareholders of 
these successful rival bidding firms neither gain nor lose from the tender offer. 
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the stockholders of targets of unsuccessful tender offers will not realize a 
permanent increase in wealth. 
Consistent with the information hypothesis, we find that target 
stockholders, on average, realize a significant positive abnormal return with 
the announcement of an offer and that these returns do not dissipate 
subsequent to the rejection of the offer. However, in contrast to this 
hypothesis, we find that the revaluation is due primarily to the anticipation 
of a future successful acquisition bid. The entire abnormal returns to the 
shareholders of the target firms that are not subsequently taken over within 
five years of an unsuccessful offer dissipate within two years of the initial 
unsuccessful bid. The shareholders of those targets that are subsequently 
taken over experience an additional positive and significant abnormal return. 
The evidence suggests that a permanent revaluation of the target shares 
requires the combination of the target resources with those of an acquiring 
firm. That is, the gains to the target stockholders stem from a synergy effect 
and not simply the revelation of new information regarding the ‘true’ value 
of the target resources. On the basis of these findings we conclude that the 
synergy hypothesis is a better description of the nature of tender offers than 
the information hypothesis. 
We separate further the sample of unsuccessful targets that are 
subsequently taken over according to the length of time between the initial, 
unsuccessful offer and the subsequent, successful offer. Comparison among 
the returns to the shareholders of the firms in these two subsamples and 
those of targets that are not subsequently taken over reveals that the 
market’s uncertainty regarding future successful acquisition bids is resolved 
in a manner that is consistent with an informationally efficient capital 
market. In light of these findings, the apparently permanent positive 
revaluation of the shares of targets of unsuccessful tender offers, which has 
been documented by previous authors, should be reinterpreted as evidence 
that the capital market forms an unbiased expectation regarding a future, 
successful acquisition bid. 
Our empirical analysis of the returns to the shares of firms that have made 
unsuccessful offers is also consistent with the synergy hypothesis. We find 
that when target stockholders reject a bid and elect to retain their current 
management, the stockholders of the unsuccessful bidding firm experience no 
significant change in wealth. However, when target stockholders reject one 
bid and accept another made by a rival bidding firm, the stockholders of the 
unsuccessful bidding firm realize a significant wealth loss subsequent to the 
rejection of the bid. A further examination of the data reveals that most of 
the wealth loss by the shareholders of the unsuccessful bidding firm occurs 
on the days surrounding the announcement of the tender offer made by the 
successful rival bidding firm. 
We interpret our results on the returns to unsuccessful bidding firms as 
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being consistent with the joint hypothesis that the ultimately successful 
bidding firm possesses a specialized resource that allows for a higher-valued 
offer and that the synergy created through a combination with the target 
places the unsuccessful bidder at a competitive disadvantage in the product 
and/or factor market. In contrast, the information hypothesis predicts no 
relation between the returns to the stockholders of unsuccessful bidding firms 
and the ultimate disposition of control of the target resources. 
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